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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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June 3, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Intermediate Actions in Laos

At the moment Article 4 consultations among five of the fourteen Geneva nations are taking place. These will not amount to a hill of beans. The next probable step will be something like the Polish proposal, modified so that this meeting will take place in Luang Prabang instead of Geneva and will include Souvanna Phouma, as well as representatives of the three factions. There will be two principal issues: restoration of the Government of National Union and PL withdrawal from the Plaine des Jarres. This meeting will fail to produce any agreement; but it will probably produce intense pressure for a fourteen-nation Geneva Conference.

We should take an intensely firm decision (probably by the President) not to attend the Geneva Conference. We should repeat this decision incessantly to our friends and enemies. Simultaneously, we should expand our air reconnaissance activities to include all those areas both in Laos and North Vietnam through which Hanoi's supply lines run into each of those countries. I understand (contrary to my previous expectations) that significant results are already being achieved. The purpose of the reconnaissance is not only to give a signal of our determination, but also to provide evidence for use before Congress and later the world.

Some of our planes will get shot at; some may even be lost. Hopefully, this will not start happening for some time, when we may be in a position to take advantage of this to begin moving down a more serious tack. This is very sketchy, but I think we must get a start on a combined military tack in Laos.

with

Michael V. Forrestal

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By *ing* NARA, Date *1-28-88*

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